Addendum to the Honeywell HARP (Honeywell Advanced Research Program)

The following document declassified from the United States State Department's historical archives provides an insight to the planning for Project AZORIAN, and an addendum to a previous blog article; https://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/2020/05/when-is-harp-is-not-refinance-of-your.html. 

The State Department's Historical Archives is officially recognized and gratitude expressed. The individual who formulated and submitted the plan is not identified, however its recipient Henry Kissinger then US Secretary of State, and as Chairman the 40 Committee is recognized. Although not so marked the original document must have been at least classified Top Secret (SCI) and was subsequently declassified.

"Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976

186. Memorandum to the Chairman of the 40 Committee (Kissinger)1

Washington, May 28, 1974.

SUBJECT

• Project AZORIAN Mission Proposal

1. This is an operational mission of [less than 1 line not declassified], planned for the period June–October 1974. The mission has been assigned [less than 1 line not declassified] code name of Project AZORIAN. The objective is the recovery of a major portion of the Soviet GOLF II CLASS submarine #722 from the ocean bottom in the North Central Pacific. 

2. Situation: 

The AZORIAN Program recovery platform, HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER, ostensibly a deep ocean mining vessel, completed a series of extensive system tests and crew training off the west coast of California on 12 May 1974. Several difficulties, now resolved, were encountered during the test program. These tests have disclosed no technical deficiencies which would indicate that the mission cannot be successfully performed. The Mission Director—the senior U.S. Government officer on board, who heads the Mission Team—stated in his summary message following the completion of these tests:

“All tests at 2,800 feet have been completed. In spite of the fact that we have had to work through many problems, all systems have worked satisfactorily. The crew has performed extremely well. I am convinced that they are qualified to begin the mission . . . It is my recommendation that following the upcoming refit and crew rest period we begin the mission (on or about 15 June).”

The ship is now in Long Beach, California undergoing final system preparations for mission readiness. If approval to depart in mid-June is received, the ship would depart Long Beach, and at normal cruising speed arrive in the vicinity of the target in fourteen days, following which the recovery operation could commence. (See Tab A.) It is mandatory that recovery operation be initiated as early as possible in the “annual weather window”—the period between 15 June and 13 August2—when there is the highest probability for sea conditions in that area of the North Pacific within which the recovery system can be successfully operated. Nominally, the on-site recovery operation would require approximately three weeks. However, if an [Page 870] allowance is included for holds caused by extreme weather or other contingencies, this period could be as long as six weeks. 

As noted above, the time used to effect resolution of technical problems encountered in sea trials has required a curtailment of the deep water test as well as the simulated mining legs which were intended to further condition the USSR to the operation of the HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER. While simulated mining legs in the Hawaiian area would have generated additional publicity and would have provided the Soviets with further opportunities to observe the vessel, there was no assurance that that would occur. Deletion of these legs will not unravel the cover nor reduce the import of the considerable publicity in the media and trade journals developed over the past four years. Ostensibly the rationale for proceeding directly to the retrieval site is to determine “weather constraints on the mining system”. Analysis of these changes indicates that this new scenario remains compatible with a commercial mining hardware test and evaluation program. To the public, all time at sea since departing Chester, Pennsylvania, has been related to mining system tests. These activities have received considerable publicity. Conduct of tests to determine “weather constraints on the mining system” in an area where data exists on the sea floor terrain and where manganese nodules exist is consistent with the logic of the deep ocean mining cover. It is reasonably certain that the Soviets are cognizant of the existance of the HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER and its purported deep ocean mining role by virtue of the extensive publicity, Soviet over head reconnaissance, and the observational opportunities Soviet vessels have had at Long Beach. 

3. Background 

The Soviet GOLF II CLASS submarine #722 was lost in the North Central Pacific, in March 1968, following which there was an extensive, but unsuccessful, search for the wreckage by the USSR. 

[2½ lines not declassified] the Chairman, United States Intelligence Board (USIB) established the G #722 as the highest priority target [less than 1 line not declassified] in August 1970. On 23 May 1974 the Chairman, USIB revalidated the requirement and indicated that “recovery of the AZORIAN submarine would provide information which can be obtained from no other source, on subjects of great importance to the national defense.” (See Tab B.)3 In October 1970, the AZORIAN Program was authorized [less than 1 line not declassified] to proceed with hardware acquisition and planning for recovery of the G #722. This decision was made recognizing that there was no other asset capable of satisfying at that time or in the fore [Page 871] seeable future, this USIB requirement. The major categories of equipment and related documents expected to be acquired include: 

Cryptographic Equipments 

Nuclear Warhead 

SS–N–5 Missile 

Navigation and Fire Control System 

Sonar and ASW Countermeasures Equipments 

4. Command and Control: 

[2½ lines not declassified] The authority for direction and control of the mission operations is delegated to the Director, Program B (DPB). The Mission Director is the senior U.S. Government command authority embarked in HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER and is in tactical command of operations.

[3 lines not declassified] There is provision for reliable and secure communications between the Control Center and the ship. In the remote possibility that the HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER is subjected to severe hostile reaction by the USSR, plans have been developed to shift the ashore command and control [less than 1 line not declassified] to CINCPACFLT, in concert with higher authority. If the mission is compromised or at any other time, higher authority has the option of initiating a bilateral dialogue with the Soviet Union via the “hot line” or by other means in order to defuse the situation thus reducing the possibility of military confrontation at sea. However, mission success is predicated on the commercial mining cover withstanding the closest scrutiny, short of a complete compromise of the program mission. An evaluation of cover adequacy is noted in paragraph 6 below.

5. Schedule: 

Recovery mission evolutions are planned to be accomplished against the following schedule subsequent to the departure of the HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER from Long Beach, California:

[Page 872] 

		Assuming 15 June Departure
Transit from Long Beach to Target Site	14 days	29 June
Target Recovery Operation	21–42 days	30 June to 20 July–10 Aug.
		Completed:
[less than 1 line not declassified] Enroute to Midway Island	21 days	10–31 Aug.
Midway Island [less than 1 line not declassified]	3 days	13 Aug.–3 Sept.
Post-Midway [less than 1 line not declassified] Lahaina Roads	28 days	10 Sept.–1 Oct.
[less than 1 line not declassified]	4 days	14 Sept.–5 Oct.
[less than 1 line not declassified]	10 days	24 Sept.–15 Oct.
Transit to West Coast	7 days	1 Oct.–22 Oct.
TOTAL:	108–129 days4	1–22 Oct.

6. Deep Ocean Mining Cover Evaluation: 

From the outset it has been recognized that there could be no overt U.S. Government involvement in AZORIAN without attracting close Soviet scrutiny, and possible realization of the actual purpose for the program. The alternative was to structure the program as a commercial venture. The determination reached was that deep ocean mining would be particularly suitable. The industry was in its infancy, potentially quite profitable, with no one apparently committed to a hardware development phase and thereby possessing a yardstick by which credibility could be measured. Hughes Tool Company’s (later Summa Corporation) participation as the sponsor and sole source of funding was a logical selection. Mr. Howard Hughes is the only stockholder; he is recognized as a pioneering entrepreneur with a wide variety of business interests; he has the necessary financial resources; he habitually operates in secrecy; and, his personal eccentricities are such that news media reporting and speculation about his activities frequently range from the truth to utter fiction. The contractor team was chosen in light of their considerable experience and competence in the deep ocean arena: Global Marine, Inc.—ship construction and system operation; Lockheed Missiles and Space Co.—capture vehicle (ostensibly the mining machine); and Honeywell, Inc.—automatic station keeping and data processing.

After more than three years of carefully managed ocean mining cover planning, development and evaluation, certain conclusions concerning cover credibility and continued viability are considered reasonable:

a. The Summa Corporation Deep Ocean Mining Project (DOMP) is recognized and accepted by the media, both news and technical, for that which it purports to be. The DOMP has been the subject of attention in a variety of technical and trade journals.

[Page 873] 

b. There is substantive evidence that the Summa project is accepted in the commercial world, both domestic and foreign, as a legitimate prototype mining enterprise. (See Tab C.)5

c. There is no evidence that the Soviets consider the deep ocean mining program to be anything but a mining venture. USSR scientific and academic institutions rely heavily on U.S. scientific and technical publications for knowledge of our activities in those arenas.

d. The classified elements of the AZORIAN recovery system hardware and mission scenario have been explained in terms of a deep ocean mining program.

7. Security: 

Security is recognized as critical in maintaining the commercial cover of the operation. Though judged to be particularly effective through the present, security is known to be affected by the number of persons involved and by the passage of time. A minimal amount of speculation departing from the cover facade is known to have occurred and is discussed more fully under Tab D.

8. [1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

9. Crew Remains: 

Provisions for handling and disposition of the target crew remains are generally in accordance with the 1949 Geneva Convention. [less than 1 line not declassified] They will be handled with due respect and returned to the ocean bottom [less than 1 line not declassified] This approach was agreed to by the Interagency Contingency Review Committee (ICRC) on 8 May 1974. (See Tab E.)

10. Mission Assessment: 

Certain conditions precedent and conclusions combine to support the assessment that the AZORIAN mission can be accomplished without incident: 

a. The recovery site is in international waters about 1,200 nm from the Soviet land mass, removed from commercial shipping lanes, and not in proximity to normal USSR or U.S. naval operating areas, except that the site does lie within the 500 nm wide USSR submarine transit lane. 

b. There is no evidence that the Soviets are sensitive to the mission site because of the G–722 loss. All indications point to their unawareness of the G–722 wreckage location. The search effort mounted by the USSR (at least 53 aircraft and 37 ships) during a two-month period, March–May 1968 proved unsuccessful. Since that time, no further Soviet search or operational activity related to that loss has been noted. This is in marked contrast to the frequent Soviet presence at the site of their NOVEMBER class submarine lost in the Atlantic. Because of the massive Soviet [Page 874] search effort, we can assume they are aware the U.S. knows of the G–722 loss, but they have shown no awareness of U.S. knowledge of the location. Furthermore, there has been no undue Soviet apprehension of the presence of U.S. hydrographic or survey ships in the loss area on numerous occasions since 1968. [less than 1 line not declassified] programmed surface surveys of the target site and general area were conducted to collect site data, enhance mining cover, and to test Soviet sensitivity to the site. The first (Project AXMINSTER), conducted by GLOMAR II during September 1970 to January 1971, received close USSR surveillance. This was attributed not to any Soviet sensitivity to the site, per se, but because the ship had intruded into the transit lane of the initial deployment of a USSR Y Class submarine to the East Pacific. The Soviet reactions to the AXMINSTER operation were subsequently analyzed by a panel [less than 1 line not declassified] (Details of the operation and the panel’s findings are contained in Tab F.) The second survey, ostensibly for future mining sites, was conducted by R.V. SEASCOPE during January-to-July 1972. The SEASCOPE operated within 45 miles of the target location and no Soviet reaction to this operation was noted. 

c. As stated above, there has been no indication that the Soviets question the authenticity of the Summa Deep Ocean Mining Program. In this regard, it is believed that any USSR requirements for information relating to the HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER would lie within their scientific and economic (not the military) communities and can largely be satisfied through open U.S. sources. The only requirement expected from the military would be as part of an assessment of the activity of all ships approaching within 1,500 nm of the Soviet land mass. As the HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER offers no military threat, chances of surveillance are problematic, yet may occur due to the site being in a Soviet submarine transit lane or due to curiosity of the technical/economic aspects of the program. 

d. Soviet opportunity to see the vessel thus far has been in satellite photography or by crews of Soviet commercial vessels visiting Long Beach or Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 

e. A thorough and systematic examination of the threat to the AZORIAN platform by Soviet surveillance throughout all phases of its deployment has produced only a limited number of vulnerabilities. Each exists in the very near field around the ship and can be exploited only by the Soviets using highly specialized collection equipment and techniques not considered to be deployed or available to the most probable group of potential surveillance platforms. An exception to this finding is possible leakage of residual plutonium (if present) from the target into the ship wake during its final preparation for entry into the ship’s center well. During this period any surface ship could collect a water sample and return it to shore for analysis at a later date. The entire AZORIAN recovery system has been designed to deny from [Page 875] even close and continuous surveillance the true purpose of AZORIAN mission operations. 

f. Operational planning is reflected in the AZORIAN Mission Operations Plan, the Contingency Operations Plan (Tab G), and Cover Contingency Plan (Tab H) (as reviewed by ICRC), and the CINCPACFLT Support Plan.

11. AZORIAN Program Phaseout: 

Ancillary to the aforementioned comprehensive preparations essential to successful mission execution are adequate provisions for an orderly and constructive AZORIAN Program phaseout. Those provisions must afford a logical evolution in the “cover rationale” to protect the value of the AZORIAN intelligence product, and minimize the possibility of U.S. Government and contractor embarrassment. Among the options available is use of AZORIAN hardware (the HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER, heavy lift pipe and electromagnetic cable) for several months following the mission in an actual commercial deep ocean mining development program. This involvement of contractors would provide needed cover reinforcement and transition to ultimate disposition of AZORIAN assets.

12. Conclusions: 

I have carefully reviewed the technical aspects of the AZORIAN program and have reached the following conclusions: 

a. The AZORIAN system has the capability to recover the target section of the G–722. 

b. Additional testing would add to my confidence level. However, such testing would cause a significant time loss of the early part of the favorable weather window. Much delay would have an adverse effect on the probability of success of the mission. It should be noted that certain tests (bottom sitting and full load) were never planned. Extensive sub-system testing and the redundancy capabilities designed in the system provide the maximum probability of success for those untested operations.

c. The mission team is technically trained and psychologically ready for the mission. I am particularly impressed with the capabilities that the mission team has shown in working around problems which occurred during sea test activities.

d. I further believe that the commercial mining cover program has been successful. There has been no indication of a serious breach in that cover. However, I must remain concerned that some exposure might occur if the program were delayed for a year. Such exposure could eliminate the possibility of conducting the operation in 1975. 

13. Recommendation: 

In view of the above, I believe that we would have the maximum probability of success by initiating the mission as soon as the ship is ready; that is, on [Page 876] or about 15 June. Therefore, it is recommended that the AZORIAN Recovery Mission be authorized to proceed as defined herein and in accordance with the attachments to this memorandum."

 

 

Forthcoming 80th Anniversary of Operation Market-Garden and Arnhem Jim Blog Origin

It is rapidly approaching the 80^th Anniversary of Operation Market-Garden, the World War II Battle of Arnhem (September 17-25 1944). It was a specific interest in this battle that initiated the Arnhem Jim blog in 2011, and which has provided the impetus for its growth and continuation to date. Suffices that the author’s companion interest in toy-soldiers/military miniatures, has served as a parallel vehicle for an apparent equal reader interest.

This being the case through the coincident introduction in 1983 and 2007, of two series of miniatures conveniently named “Arnhem ’44” and “Market-Garden” by Andy C. Nielson of King & County Miliary Miniatures located in Hong Kong. Of coincidence, being this author’s opportunity to serve as technical consultant on one of his series military vehicles (Universal “Bren” Carrier, M Mk III).

However, returning to the principal subject of the anniversary of the battle, the author has spent over a decade of research and analysis documented in the blog; http://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/p/operation-market-garden.html

It is always gratifying as a rank amateur military historian, to be effectively acknowledged as correct by an established best selling author, and former active duty British Army officer, Antony Beevor.

With full acknowledgement and expressed gratitude the following recent article condenses analysis from his book, ARNHEM; The Battle for the Bridges, (Viking 2018).

"Why Operation Market Garden, the Allies' battle for Arnhem, was a disaster in the planning

Antony Beevor

Market Garden, the ill-fated Allied operation to break through the German defences in the Netherlands in September 1944, is often portrayed as a risky yet worthy gamble. In truth, argues historian Antony Beevor, it was a flawed idea from the start, more driven by ego than practical considerations.

There are many myths about the battle for Arnhem and Operation Market Garden. Historians of the battle have often been tempted into the ‘if-only’ trap. If only this, or if only that, had been different, then it would all have turned out to be a brilliant success. This cherry-picking of faults is a grave distraction from the harsh fact that Market Garden was a perfect example of how not to plan an airborne operation.

Market Garden was one of the greatest Allied disasters of the Second World War – immortalised in the 1977 film A Bridge Too Far. The plan was for Allied paratroopers and land forces to launch a combined attack, which would break through German defences in the Netherlands. Beginning on 17 September 1944, it ended in failure just a week later, resulting in thousands of casualties. The British airborne troops who spearheaded the assault suffered particularly badly in their doomed attempt to capture the bridge in the Dutch town of Arnhem.

A month earlier, the mood among the Allies had been very different, as their forces routed the Germans in the concluding phases of the Battle of Normandy. As they advanced towards the Reich, the Allied commanders now had to decide on the next step to take. It was here that the disastrous plan was born.

At the heart of the failure in preparation lay the ambition of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, who had commanded the Allied ground forces in Normandy. He wanted to seize control of Allied strategy by being first across the Rhine so that General Dwight D Eisenhower, supreme commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces in Europe, would have to give him full priority in supplies and command over American formations. The prospect of ‘jumping the Rhine’ with an airborne operation leading all the way to the bridge at Arnhem, the northern route into Germany, would force the First US Army to support him on his right flank.

 

To do this, Montgomery needed the First Allied Airborne Army, formed on 2 August 1944 on the order of Eisenhower, who thought a single agency was required to coordinate airborne and troop carrier units. Despite Eisenhower’s devotion to balanced Allied relations, its leadership was lopsided. US general Lewis Brereton’s staff consisted mainly of US air force officers. The only senior British officer was Brereton’s deputy, Lieutenant General Frederick Browning. Matters were not helped by a strong mutual dislike between Brereton and ‘Boy’ Browning. The only characteristic the two men shared was vanity.

More like this

Browning, a hawk-faced Grenadier Guards officer with the air of a matinée idol, was married to the author Daphne du Maurier. Although brave, Browning was highly strung. He was desperate to command an airborne corps in action. His barely concealed ambition, combined with a peremptory manner, did not endear him to American paratroop commanders.

On 3 September, Montgomery met General Omar Bradley to discuss an airborne operation in south Belgium across the river Meuse. They agreed to cancel it, as Bradley wanted the troop carrier aircraft to deliver fuel to Patton’s Third Army. But Montgomery had not been straight with Bradley. He promptly ordered his chief of staff to organise an airborne operation “to secure bridges over Rhine between Wesel and Arnhem”. This was to be called Operation Comet, an idea in keeping with Montgomery’s ambition to lead the main push into Germany. Needless to say, Bradley was furious when he discovered that Montgomery had tricked him.

Freezing out the air force

‘Boy’ Browning was far from alone in his desire to use paratroop and glider forces in a decisive way. American generals longed to try out the new airborne army. Churchill also wanted the operation to boost British prestige. Victory euphoria following the rapid Allied advance from Normandy to Belgium fuelled a mood of optimism.

Unfortunately, Montgomery did not want to consult the RAF over Comet, even though the War Office and Air Ministry had agreed, following airborne chaos in the invasion of Sicily in 1943, that the air force side must lead the planning process. Montgomery even called Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory “a gutless bugger” because he had predicted disaster for the airborne drops that had taken place in the assault on Normandy.

On 9 September 1944, the commander of the Polish Independent Parachute Brigade, Major General Sosabowski, joined Roy Urquhart of the First Airborne Division to discuss Comet with Browning. “Sir,” said Sosabowski, “I am very sorry, but this mission cannot possibly succeed.” It would be suicide with such small forces, he said. Browning took deep offence.

In Belgium, General Dempsey, commanding the Second British Army, had just reached similar conclusions to those of Sosabowski. General Horrocks of the British XXX Corps (which would later play a key role in Market Garden) had confirmed that a bridgehead over the Albert Canal in north-east Belgium was “being strongly opposed by the enemy”.

The next morning, Dempsey went to Montgomery’s headquarters and managed to persuade him that Operation Comet was too weak. They needed at least three airborne divisions. Montgomery liked the idea. It would bring the American 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions under his command. But to Dempsey’s dismay, Montgomery also brandished a signal at him that had arrived from London. The first V2 rockets had landed in England, having apparently been fired from the area of Rotterdam and Amsterdam. For Montgomery, who wanted to go north via Arnhem (Dempsey preferred to go east), this was the just the confirmation he needed to justify his decision.

Dempsey summoned Browning. In just two hours, they put together a plan. Market Garden consisted of two parts. Market was the airborne operation, in which the American 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions would seize river and canal crossings from Eindhoven to Nijmegen, with the bridges over the rivers Meuse and Waal, the largest in Europe; the British First Airborne Division and the Polish brigade would drop near Arnhem to capture the great road bridge over the Lower Rhine. Operation Garden would consist principally of Horrocks’s XXX Corps, led by tanks, charging north to meet the airborne troops. They would have to travel up a single road, with flood plain on either side broken only by woods and plantations.

Montgomery’s complaints were halted by Eisenhower saying, 'Monty, you can’t speak to me like that'

Montgomery now headed for Brussels aerodrome to see Eisenhower. It was the famous meeting when Montgomery’s tirade of complaints was halted by Eisenhower putting his hand on Montgomery’s knee, and saying: “Monty, you can’t speak to me like that. I’m your boss.” Eisenhower reminded Montgomery that he had previously given him the support of the First Allied Airborne Army, yet this led to no more than a mention of Market Garden. Here, Eisenhower followed standard US Army practice. Having agreed an overall strategy, he did not believe in interfering further.

By the time Montgomery returned to his tactical headquarters, Dempsey had “fixed with [Browning] the outline of the operation”, his diary entry stated. Browning’s excitement was palpable. He sent the codeword ‘New’ from Dempsey’s HQ back to First Allied Airborne Army at Sunninghill Park. This signified that a planning conference was to be called that evening. Brereton must have been affronted that Montgomery had made no attempt to consult him in advance. Eisenhower had ordered that planning should be shared. Montgomery had deliberately ignored this.

Fateful meeting

Twenty-seven senior officers gathered in the Sunninghill Park conference room at 6pm. Astonishingly, neither Urquhart nor Sosabowski had been invited. Browning presented what he and Dempsey had worked out, using an airlift timetable based on an earlier operation. Disingenuously, he implied that it had Eisenhower’s blessing. Brereton and his staff privately dismissed it as just “a tentative skeleton plan”.

They first of all decided that it was to be a day operation because “the supporting air forces available could knock out flak positions in advance”. Brereton then asked Major General Williams of IX Troop Carrier Command to speak. His words must have come as a bombshell to Browning. Most of the key assumptions on which he and Dempsey had worked that day were now thrown in the air. “The lift would have to be modified, due to the distance involved, which precluded the use of double tow lift… single tow only could be employed.” This meant only half the number of gliders could be taken on each lift. And since the mid-September days were shorter and the mornings mistier, Williams ruled out two lifts in a day.

These changes signified that it would take up to three days to deliver the airborne divisions, assuming perfect flying weather. No more assault troops would be landing on the crucial first day than with Comet, because half the force would have to be left behind to guard landing and drop zones for later lifts. And the Germans, having identified Allied intentions, would be able to concentrate troops and anti-aircraft batteries against these areas. Williams’ obdurate attitude might have contained an element of revenge after Montgomery’s refusal to consult the air force side in advance, but Montgomery’s determination to impose an ill-considered plan was the real problem.

At a follow-up meeting, American air force officers more or less dictated the choice of drop and landing zones. Their main priority was to avoid German flak batteries on the way in and out. Major General Williams also rejected the idea of glider-borne coup de main parties (advance assault troops) to seize the main bridges, a key element in Comet.

Troop Carrier Command wanted to stay well away from the key objectives of Arnhem and Nijmegen bridges because of their anti-aircraft defences. At Arnhem, they were also threatened by the Luftwaffe airfield of Deelen just to the north of the town. As a result, the British division was to be dropped well to the west, with an approach march of between six and eight miles to the road bridge through a major town. Surprise, the most vital element in airborne operations, was therefore lost before they even took off.

An ill-conceived idea

Operation Market Garden was quite simply a very bad plan right from the start and right from the top. Every other problem stemmed from that. Montgomery had not shown any interest in the practical problems surrounding airborne operations. He had not taken any time to study the often chaotic experiences of north Africa, Sicily and the drop on the Cotentin peninsula in Normandy. His intelligence chief, Brigadier Bill Williams, also pointed to the way that: “Arnhem depended on a study of the ground [which] Monty had not made when he decided on it.” In fact, Montgomery obstinately refused to listen to Dutch warnings about the impossibility of deploying XXX Corps off the single raised road onto the polderland flood plain.

Towering over everything was the fact that the operation depended on everything going right, when it is an unwritten rule of warfare that no plan survives contact with the enemy. This is doubly true of airborne operations. The likelihood of the Germans blowing the road bridge at Nijmegen over the river Waal was barely discussed. Had they done so – and their failure to do so was an uncharacteristic mistake – XXX Corps could never have reached the First Airborne at Arnhem in time.

Flaws in the plan became more evident day by day, but Browning refused to advise Montgomery to reconsider the operation. On 12 September, Sosabowski heard that the number of gliders allocated to him had been reduced. He would have to leave behind all his artillery while his anti-tank guns would be landed on the opposite side of the river to his main force. Two days later, he pointed out that the bridgehead to be held extended for 10 miles in difficult terrain. There was thus the possibility that his brigade might have to drop straight onto enemy-held ground. And if the British failed to capture the bridge, the Poles would be left on the wrong side of the river.

Operation Market Garden was quite simply a very bad plan right from the start and right from the top

British brigade commanders were not nearly so critical, mainly because they could not face another cancellation. They just wanted to get on with it. And, in the view of Brigadier Hicks, who commanded the First Air Landing brigade, Market Garden at least seemed to stand a better chance than several “absolutely insane” previous plans.

Brigadier General Jim Gavin of the 82nd Airborne was appalled that Urquhart should have accepted drop and landing zones so far from his main objective. Yet Gavin himself had been told by Browning that his first priority was to secure the Groesbeek heights south-east of Nijmegen. They overlooked the Reichswald, a great forest just across the German border, thought to conceal tanks. Browning's argument was that if the Germans occupied the Groesbeek heights, then their artillery could stop XXX Corps reaching Nijmegen. Its great road-bridge thus slipped down to become a lower priority, partly because the First Allied Airborne Army refused to land coup de main glider parties.

Montgomery refused to listen when Eisenhower's HQ expressed concern about German strength around Arnhem. The SS Panzer Divisions Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg were indeed in the area, although with only three serviceable Panther tanks and fewer than 6,000 men between them. Yet they were still able to form a nucleus onto which other less experienced units could be grafted. What the Allies failed to grasp was the extraordinary ability of the German military machine to react with speed and determination. Almost all the tanks that Allied troops faced in Market Garden were not present at the start of the operation, but were brought in from Germany on Blitztransport trains.

Anyone with any experience of airborne operations could see that the British landing and dropping zones, up to eight miles to the west of Arnhem, were too far away to achieve surprise. Major General Richard Gale, who had commanded the Sixth Airborne Division on D-Day, warned Browning that the lack of coup de main parties was likely to be disastrous and that he would have resigned rather than accept the plan. Browning refused to agree and asked Gale not to mention it to anyone else as it might damage morale.

There was little Urquhart could do about the other basic flaw. While the First Parachute Brigade was to march off towards the bridge, Hicks’s First Airlanding Brigade would have to remain behind to guard the drop and landing zones ready for Hackett’s Fourth Brigade. This meant that Urquhart had just a single brigade to secure his chief objective, and his division would be split in two with a wide gap in-between. Worse still, his signals officers were rightly worried that their radios might not work over that distance.

Suicide operation

Urquhart gave no hint in any of his reports, or in his book written after the war, that he opposed the plan, but then he was not a man to rock the boat or contradict the subsequent version of events that Arnhem had been a heroic, worthwhile gamble. Yet according to General Browning’s aide, Captain Eddie Newbury, on 15 September Urquhart appeared in Browning’s office at Moor Park, and strode over to his desk. “Sir,” he said, “you’ve ordered me to plan this operation and I have done it, and now I wish to inform you that I think it is a suicide operation.” (Editorial Note: It is by virtue of the recollection of this quotation that MGEN Robert E. “Roy” Urquhart should be exonerated of any substantive responsibility for the failure of Operation Market-Garden.)

The fears of those who had grave doubts about Market Garden were soon realised. Out of the First Airborne Division, only a single battalion made it to the bridge at Arnhem and could hold no more than its northern approach. At Nijmegen, the 82nd Airborne lacked the strength to secure its flank on the German border and also seize the great bridge over the Waal until after the much-delayed Guards Armoured Division finally arrived. By then the battalion at the Arnhem bridge had been crushed, and on 25 September, the battered remnants of the First Airborne at Oosterbeek had to evacuate to the south bank of the Lower Rhine. Out of approximately 10,600 men north of the Rhine, some 7,900 were left behind – dead, wounded and PoWs.

The Dutch suffered not just the 3,600 killed and nearly 20,000 severely disabled in the fighting, but faced German vengeance afterwards for having helped the Allies. More than 200,000 civilians were forced from their homes, which were looted and destroyed. The northern Netherlands were then subjected to famine quite deliberately in what became known as the Hunger Winter, with around 18,000 dead from starvation. They were the chief victims of the disastrous plan for Operation Market Garden.

Who were the key Allied players in Operation Market Garden?

Eisenhower and Montgomery

THE CHIEF AND THE CHEERLEADER

The man in charge of Allied forces in Europe, Eisenhower found the opinionated hero of El Alamein, Montgomery, difficult to work with. Eisenhower even considered sacking Monty after Operation Goodwood, part of the Normandy campaign, but feared a backlash in Britain.

Frederick Browning

UP FOR THE FIGHT

The British deputy commander of the First Allied Airborne Army was desperate to command troops in battle and pushed to make Market Garden a reality.

Lewis H Brereton

SIDELINED FLYER

Monty didn’t consult Browning’s American boss – or any other airman – over Market Garden.

Stanisław Sosabowski

PLAIN-SPEAKING POLE

The paratrooper warned that Market Garden would fail. This infuriated British commanders and they took revenge.

Miles Dempsey

THE PLANNER

The commander of the British Second Army helped draw up Market Garden but was worried the plan had serious flaws.

Roy Urquhart

THE DUTIFUL SCEPTIC

Urquhart thought Market Garden to be “a suicide mission” but methodically helped bring the plan to fruition.

Williams

TRANSPORT CARRIER COMMAND

The USAAF general rejected key parts of the plan yet Browning did not tell Monty he should reconsider.

Antony Beevor is one of the leading historians of the Second World War. His new book is Arnhem: The Battle for the Bridges, 1944 (Viking, 2018)."

 

For those readers who might be interested in learning additional information about Operation Market-Garden the following article from HISTORY EXTRA, with total acknowledgement and fully expressed gratitude;

 

"9 things you (probably) didn’t know about the battle of Arnhem

The battle of Arnhem (17–25 September 1944) was a bold – but ultimately failed – attempt to outflank German defences in north-west Europe by establishing a bridgehead across the lower Rhine river at the Dutch town of Arnhem. Author Iain Ballantyne reveals nine lesser-known facts about the battle.

The plan was for Allied paratroopers and land forces to launch a combined attack, which would break through German defences in the Netherlands. But the bridge at Arnhem was never captured – the plan ended in failure just a week later, resulting in thousands of casualties. Codenamed Operation Market Garden, it was the largest airborne operation in history and one of the biggest disasters of the Allied war effort. 

Here, Iain Ballantyne, author of Arnhem: Ten Days in The Cauldron, reveals nine lesser-known facts about the battle immortalised in the 1977 film A Bridge Too Far…

During the battle of Arnhem in September 1944, great valour was shown by lightly armed British Airborne troops in the face of German panzers [tanks] and other heavy weaponry. Meanwhile, the people of the town on the Lower Rhine, and its suburb of Oosterbeek, suffered terribly as the combatants grappled to the death in their streets and even in their homes.

 

The prime objective of using 30,000 British and American paratroopers and glider-borne infantry to seize multiple river and canal crossing between the Dutch-Belgian border and the Rhine was to enable tanks and troops to dash up 64 miles of highway deep into the Netherlands. The British Second Army was then to make a right hook into Germany and take the Ruhr – the heart of the enemy war industries – intending to force the collapse of Hitler’s military machine.

However, another urgent priority was to capture territory in the Netherlands from which V2 ballistic missiles were being launched in an attempt to devastate London and other parts of southern England. That terrifying missile blitz had only just started in September 1944 when Operation Market Garden began, and the Allies badly wanted to snuff out the V2 threat.

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Sergeants J Whawell and J Turrell of the Glider Pilot Regiment of the 1st Allied Airborne Army search a bomb-damaged school in the Netherlands for snipers during the battle of Arnhem. (Photo by Keystone/Getty Images)

When looking at this famous episode in the Second World War, I decided to focus on the struggle at the very tip of the lunge into the Netherlands. In writing Arnhem: Ten Days in The Cauldron, I was able tease out of the stories of individual soldiers and civilians caught up in the chaos and destruction of a savage battle, including some remarkable aspects that offer a more nuanced understanding even 75 years on.

Three Bridges Too Far

The decision to extend the attack so far behind enemy lines was famously described by Lt General Frederick ‘Boy’ Browning – top field commander of the Allied Airborne forces – as possibly “a bridge too far”. This remark was made to Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, the overall commander of the British-led 21^st Army Group and mastermind of Market Garden, when he and Browning were discussing the plan.

When Montgomery asked Browning if the 1^st Airborne Division could take and hold the road bridge at Arnhem for two days, Browning suggested his troops could do it for twice as long – but added a telling caveat about the wisdom of the plan’s final objective: “I think we might be going a bridge too far,” said Browning. This famous response inspired the title of Irish reporter and historian Cornelius Ryan’s classic book on the operation, A Bridge Too Far, which was itself made into a spectacular star-studded Hollywood war movie in the mid-1970s.

In fact, it was a case of three bridges too far. Not only were the British Airborne troops asked to capture the road bridge over at Arnhem, but also a railway bridge and pontoon bridge. The former was blown up as paratroopers ventured onto it, while the latter had been dismantled.

Germans v Germans

The first soldiers of the 1^st Airborne Division to drop into the Netherlands on 17 September 1944 were the 21^stIndependent Parachute Company, the pathfinders who marked out the Drop Zones (DZs) and Landing Zones (LZs) and set up homing beacons. Among them were Germans and Austrians who had assumed fake British identities in order to fight the Nazis. They were Jewish refugees who had fled persecution in their homelands and were determined to exact payback on behalf of loved ones and families who had suffered so much under Adolf Hitler.

They were very fierce soldiers and, despite the fact they would probably be shot as traitors if taken prisoner, they made no secret of their identities, shouting insults at their foes in German.

Dutch bullets, Dutch kisses

On 18 September, when the second lift of 1^st Airborne Division troops was going DZs and LZs beyond Arnhem – leaping from their Dakota troop transports or coming to earth in gliders – they were shot at by Dutch soldiers. Those troops belonged to Landstorm Nederland, a unit of the Waffen SS composed of Nazi collaborators. Dutch SS troops even fought soldiers of the Free Netherlands Army’s Princess Irene Brigade during earlier battles, in northern Belgium.

No sooner had some British soldiers survived the experience of being shot at by the Dutch SS near Arnhem than they were being embraced and kissed by overjoyed locals. The civilians came out to the DZs and LZs to greet the British soldiers with water and wine, to celebrate liberation, which sadly proved short lived.

War among the people

The majority of Dutch civilians of course hated the Nazis and yearned to be free of a brutal occupation after more than four years of oppression. They greeted the arrival of British troops with great joy, but, in the subsequent battle, thousands of them were trapped in the cellars of their homes in Arnhem town and neighbouring Oosterbeek.

As the Airborne soldiers shot at the enemy from rooms in houses on once-pleasant and pristine streets, beneath their feet civilians sheltered in the cellars and miserably awaited their fate. Enduring terrible conditions for days – going short of water and food, their homes destroyed above them as exploding artillery shells, machine gun fire and grenades roared all around – they were often terrified. Hundreds of civilians were killed during the fighting, but the astonishing thing is that thousands of those who took refuge in cellars survived.

On emerging from the cellars, they were told by the Germans to leave and not come back: anyone who did not evacuate themselves from Oosterbeek and Arnhem would be shot.

Despite the British bringing ruin to their homes, the Dutch people to this day salute the sacrifice of the Airborne soldiers who tried and failed to lift the yoke of fascist oppression.

Suffer not the animals

Suffering alongside the humans as the battle raged in the streets, fields, woods and gardens were animals — some of which fought back. One British soldier who threw himself into a slit trench to escape death under German bombardment found he was sharing it with a fierce little squirrel. It proceeded to attack him and had very sharp teeth. Hurling the animal out, the soldier found the squirrel determined not to yield. It bolted back into the trench and burrowed underneath him.

During the battle at Oosterbeek, a Dutch girl (who could speak English) pleaded with a British paratrooper to help her care for a horse, which was in a barn behind her house. He reluctantly took her out to feed and water the animal, fearing they would be shot down. Yet the Germans held their fire while Corporal Harry Tucker and the girl cared for the animal. Tucker later said: “I told the girl to hurry up with feeding and watering the horse. We then went back across the yard and she thanked me for helping her. The thing that still amazes me is that not a single shot was fired at us during the whole episode. Maybe the Germans were showing us some mercy, or maybe they were just temporarily out of ammo.”

One British officer even brought an animal with him to Arnhem from England. This was Myrtle the (so-called) parachick, a hen who jumped into battle strapped to the shoulder of paratrooper Lieutenant Pat Glover in a special canvas bag. Sadly, during a skirmish Myrtle was exposed to fire and killed.

Just pick up the phone

The radio problems suffered by the 1^st Airborne Division at Arnhem are well-known. The radios may have worked sufficiently in carefully controlled exercises on Salisbury Plain, but they did not function well in the tree-lined suburbs, woods and polder of Holland [lowland reclaimed from a body of water by building dikes and drainage canals]. However, the British could have just picked up the phone. Much of the local telephone system functioned throughout the battle and was used to great effect by the Germans, who had seen a lot of their radio equipment destroyed during the retreat from Normandy. The British made limited use of the telephones as they did not trust them to be secure.

The famous episode in the 1977 movie A Bridge Too Far, in which 1^st Airborne Division commander Major General Roy Urquhart (played by Sean Connery) is forced by radio problems to race around in a jeep, trying to speak to his commanders face-to-face, is absolutely true. Not only was Urquhart at one point trapped in an attic while evading enemy patrols, but he really did shoot dead a German soldier wo made the mistake of peering in the front window of another house the general was hiding in.

Vera Lynn and other psychological warfare

Radio contact was established with higher command headquarters and even between some units, when ranges were short. As part of normal practice, both sides listened in to each other’s radio broadcasts and tried to interfere with them. They exchanged insults over the airwaves, sometimes also masquerading as each other in attempts to glean intelligence or trip up their foe.

The Germans tried to break the British troops’ spirit by broadcasting loudspeaker messages suggesting their sweethearts were missing them and that senior British commanders had been taken prisoner. They even tried to make the British homesick by broadcasting Vera Lynn songs, which, rather than break the Airborne troops’ morale, raised their spirits. The British replied with loud curses and used their weapons to destroy the offending enemy loudspeakers.

At the Arnhem bridge, the senior Waffen SS commander thought he could persuade Lt Col John Frost, commander of the British force, to surrender by sending a captured Airborne soldier to tell him resistance was useless. They best give up or die! Frost decided such a tactic was evidence of enemy desperation. He and his troops became even more determined to keep on fighting, hoping Allied tanks and troops charging up the highway would soon reach his besieged force.

For the Allies, the war was not over

Eventually, with very few weapons left to fight the panzers, the British at the Arnhem road bridge surrendered. When the 1^st Airborne Division – trapped in a cauldron of fire at Oosterbeek, with its back to the river ­– withdrew across the Rhine, it left behind several thousand wounded and/or captured soldiers, in addition to 1,200 dead.

Many of these elite troops were determined that this was not going to be the end of the matter. Hundreds of them evaded the enemy, or almost immediately escaped captivity to go on the run and into hiding with brave Dutch hosts. Some escaped from prison camps in Germany. As the Reich collapsed in April and May 1945, many of the remaining PoWs found themselves left to their own devices by guards who disappeared to avoid capture by the Allies.

One of the most remarkable escapes was by Major Tony Deane-Drummond who, after being taken prisoner in Arnhem, hid in a book cupboard for two weeks, surviving on a lump of stale bread and a little water. Once he felt the coast was clear of enemy troops, Deane-Drummond emerged and eventually made it to sanctuary and then home thanks to help from the Resistance and other Dutch people.

Along the way, while hiding out with a Dutch family, Deane-Drummond would visit nearby homes to listen to secret radios in an attempt to keep up with news from the outside world. During one listening session he met Baroness van Heemstra, whose family came from Arnhem, mother to 15-year-old daughter Edda – who would after the war be known to the world as the Hollywood actress Audrey Hepburn. The future movie star’s mother later sent a bottle of champagne to the house where Deane-Drummond was hiding to cheer him up.

Working with the SAS, Dutch Resistance and British intelligence operatives, some fugitive 1^st Airborne Division officers organised a mass escape over the Rhine in late 1944. The British escapers were organised into fully armed units and, with assistane from American paratroopers and Canadian assault engineers, finally got out of enemy territory.

Hitler’s last victory in the west

Arnhem was the last time the Germans inflicted a major defeat on the Allies in the west. From then on, they lost every battle against the British, American and Canadian armies, while the Red Army steamroller shattered German armies in the east. At Arnhem, and also during the subsequent Ardennes offensive of December 1944, the Germans expended their last military capital in the west. While the fighting remained hard in the west, the British-led forces in the north were able to send a massive airborne and amphibious assault across the Rhine in spring 1945. The Reich was finished.

It would be going too far to say the western Allies could have perhaps taken Berlin if the Germans had lost at Arnhem. It was not in Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D Eisenhower’s endgame plan to do so, as he preferred to leave that bloody job to the Russians. Yet, the effort involved in achieving victory at Arnhem and staging the Ardennes attack helped sap German forces at a time when they needed everything they could get to defend the Reich itself.

Iain Ballantyne is a journalist, editor, and author who has written several military history books, including those on the Second World War and the Cold War. His latest book, Arnhem: Ten Days in The Cauldron, is his second title for Agora Books, following on from Bismarck: 24"

Specific Events

Individuals with a specific interest in attending currently scheduled events are advised to refer to URL;

https://arnhem1944fellowship.org/arnhem-commemorations-2024/.

Military miniatures commemorating Operation Market-Garden Battle of Arnhem

Others who may be interested in obtaining military miniatures recreating the battle may want to refer to following specific articles within this blog;

http://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/2011/03/whats-form-general-mgen-re-urquhart-at.html

http://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/2011/03/battle-of-arnhem-whos-son-and-heir.html 

https://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/2014/03/a-photographic-catalog-operation-market.html   

http://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/2015/09/operation-market-garden-series-by-king.html

http://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/2015/09/wolfheze-junction-it-werent-no-ok.html

https://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/2017/09/an-addendum-to-photographic-catalog.html